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Abstract
Despite their rich theoretical and practical importance, criminologists have paid scant attention to the patterns of crime and the
responses to crime during exceptional events. Throughout the world large-scale political, social, economic, cultural, and sporting
events have become commonplace. Natural disasters such as blackouts, hurricanes, tornadoes, and tsunamis present similar
opportunities. Such events often tax the capacities of jurisdictions to provide safety and security in response to the exceptional
event, as well as to meet the “routine” public safety needs. This article examines “routine” crime as measured by calls for police
service, official crime reports, and police arrests in Salt Lake City before, during, and after the 2002 Olympic Games. The analyses
suggest that while a rather benign demographic among attendees and the presence of large numbers of social control agents might
have been expected to decrease calls for police service for minor crime, it actually increased in Salt Lake during this period. The
implications of these findings are considered for theories of routine activities, as well as systems capacity.
© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Despite a wide array of theories explaining crime,
there has been surprisingly little criminological attention
devoted to understanding the impact of exceptional
events on patterns of routine crime or demands for a
criminal justice response, most particularly police
responses during such times. Such exceptional events
could include natural disasters, terrorist acts, large-scale
political, governmental, or international meetings, or
sports-related events. These events are often concen-
trated in geographic space and may facilitate the
opportunity for crime. At the same time, “routine”
public safety needs outside concentrated geographic
spaces persist. Focusing criminological research and
theory on such events to determine their influence on
criminal behavior contributes to the understanding of
crime, most particularly in a world where such events
are present and represent an increasing challenge to
communities and their response systems (Decker et al.,
2005). It might be argued that criminal behavior
occurring at times of natural disaster (flood, hurricane,
earthquake, and the like) or terrorism might be
explained by general criminological theories emphasiz-
ing anomie or opportunity. On the other hand, planned
events like the Olympics, political conventions, and
other major social or governmental mass attractions
provide a fertile opportunity to examine the impact of
such events on routine criminal activity. This article
focuses on the impact of such planned events on theories
of crime and police response using the 2002 Olympic
Games in Salt Lake City.
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Safety and security at the Olympics
While the safety and security of athletes, staff, and
spectators has perhaps always been a concern of the
Olympic Games, events that took place in Munich in
1972 forever changed safety and security at such events.
The murder of Israeli athletes by terrorists shattered the
then prevailing myth that such athletic events trans-
cended politics. The 1996 bombing in Centennial Park
during the Atlanta games reinforced the potential for
exceptional crime to take place during such international
events and called into question understanding of how
such events occur and their implications for local social
control.
Two factors make the provisions of safety and
security at the Olympic Games extremely important for
consideration. First, the Olympic Games have very
strong socio-political roots. The role of nationalism in
the competition, among spectators and officials makes
providing safety and security a somewhat more complex
issue than for many domestic sporting events. Rather
than “two sides” playing a game, there are dozens, even
hundreds of “sides” or cultural interests that shape safety
and security issues associated with Olympic events. The
strong economic implications of the games, with billions
of dollars committed and substantial opportunities for
profit—or loss—also complicate the public safety
response. The economic implications of the games are
not limited to the events themselves, but also include the
local economy and the infrastructure of the host city(ies)
that may be affected during the course of the games.
Second, any Olympic security effort must manage
both ordinary and extra-ordinary crime and public safety
matters in the same geographic and social context, and
at the same time. While Olympic security planners and
line level personnel prepare for the worst, the reality is
that they deal almost exclusively with mundane issues
(Decker et al., 2005). These include responding to
routine calls for service, crime and other public safety
issues in the host city that occur outside, in, and around
Olympic venues. The system must plan for, deploy
resources to, and deal with both routine and exceptional
crime, in and out of the Olympic envelope.
In addition to responses to crime (routine and
exceptional), the management of interactions among
the myriad players involved in Olympic safety and
security is a complicated process and a key to successful
operations. This is especially the case when the games
are distributed throughout a city and its surrounding
environs. Even given the varying conditions (range of
venues and visitor populations) created in support of the
Olympics, routine public safety must be maintained
among the non-Olympic segments of the population as
well. After all, these are the groups that will remain after
the Olympics are long gone; they provide the basic tax
revenues that support public safety and criminal justice
before, during, and after the games.
The challenge of police responses to large-scale
special events—in the present case the 2002 Salt Lake
Winter Olympic Games is the key topic examined here.
Specifically routine and non-routine crime during the
Salt Lake Olympic Games are examined as well as the
way such crimes test the capacity of law enforcement to
respond to citizen demand for services. Key assump-
tions of routine activities theory as they are affected by
the Olympic Games are examined. The presence of the
games should affect many components of routine
activities theory: (1) the presence of the games should
attract motivated offenders, (2) routines within the
hosting area are likely to be disrupted giving a large
influx of “outsiders” to the games, but those people are
likely focused on patterns of behavior which are
particular to those who would victimize them (atten-
dance at drinking establishments, scalping of tickets,
unfamiliarity of the local area so as to remove some
level of “rational decision making” on the part of the
potential victims), and (3) both the number of suitable
guardians as well as potential targets should be
increased owing to increased police presence to
accommodate large crowds of spectators. Taken togeth-
er these changes to local “routine behavior” may also
witness increases in crime and victimization. This
analysis pursues this question.
Routine crime in exceptional times
As previously suggested, criminology has paid little
attention to the impact of exceptional events, such as
the Olympics, on patterns of routine crime and
community demand for criminal justice services
(Alpert & Flynn, 2000). Planned events like the
Olympics, political conventions, and other major
events provide a fertile opportunity to examine the
impact of such events on routine criminal activity and
the ability of public officials to manage and respond to
routine and exceptional crime. These types of excep-
tional events, whether planned or unplanned, hold the
capacity for affecting crime patterns through a variety
of mechanisms.
Routine activities theory is one suitable theoretical
framework for understanding this relationship. Propo-
nents of routine activities theory see crime as being
largely shaped by the presence of suitable targets and
motivated offenders who come together in time and
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space, mediated by guardians capable of preventing
such events (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The primary
interest of the current research was to determine if large-
scale exceptional events fundamentally alter these
dynamics in a way that changes crime patterns.
The Olympic Games and other similar large-scale
events have the potential for upsetting the balance
between suitable targets, motivated offenders, and the
presence of capable guardians. Large events can result
in shifting populations and possible changes to the
physical environment. Shifting populations may be
indicative of an influx of a large number of “strangers”
into the host location, but also the possible mass exodus
of “locals.” Modifications to the physical environment
often include changes to vehicle or pedestrian traffic
patterns or target hardening measures such as security
cameras. Finally, such events may also result in changes
in the absolute number of “capable guardians” (e.g.,
police, non-police security personnel, or other person-
nel) or non-routine shifts in personnel among locations
or assignments. All of these direct influences have the
capacity to alter the dynamics of routine activities that
are critical to the occurrence or prevention of direct-
contact predatory violations (Cohen & Felson, 1979).
The relative lack of empirical and theoretical attention to
routine crime during such exceptional events is
somewhat puzzling given the widely used theoretical
foundation of routine activities theory.
Literature review
There is no widely accepted theoretical framework
traditionally applied to the study of large-scale planned
or unplanned events as researchers have generally failed
to consider their impact on crime patterns. The few
researchers who have considered this area of study have
either applied the social disorganization or social
cohesion traditions (Siegel, Bourque, & Shoaf, 1999)
to understanding the dynamics of such events. While
such frameworks are useful, they fail to consider the
more likely impact of such events on patterns and cha-
racteristics of “normal” or “routine” social interactions.
Previous research
Unplanned events such as earthquakes, fires, black-
outs, and other natural disasters offer a parallel to the
effect of exceptional events such as the Olympics on
routine crime. While such events are unplanned, they
reflect many of the challenges faced by planned events.
For each category of event (planned or unplanned), there
is an area of primary activity where resources are
heavily concentrated, as well as “routine” areas where
things proceed “as usual.” Each type of event also places
strains on available technical or personnel resources.
Most research in this area had found little effect of the
exceptional event on routine patterns of crime.
Siegel et al. (1999) examined patterns of crime,
victimization, and traumatic stress following the North-
ridge earthquakes in 1995. They found static patterns
across each of their measures, and suggested that events
such as an earthquake did not have much impact on
routine crime and stressors or at least that stressors
produced by natural disasters and community cohesion
might balance each other out in terms of their impacts.
The authors did not specifically test the tenets of a
given theory, but instead hypothesized that post-event
increases in both measures would fit the ideas of social
disorganization and decreases in both would be
suggestive of community social cohesion. Instead,
they found few changes in either measure. Similarly,
few changes were found in predicted property crime
rates and actual rates after the Quebec ice storm of 1998
(Lemieux, 1998). The authors did note, however, that
an increased police presence, the increased military
presence, and the distribution of relief checks were
related to small decreases in property crime. Prelimi-
nary assessment of the impact of such events, then,
suggests large-scale natural disasters have little-to-no
discernible impact on crime patterns, especially violent
crime.
Perhaps the best examples of the impact of excep-
tional events on routine crime can be found in the great
Northeast blackouts, in New York City in 1965 and
1977. Remarkably, the primary source of such informa-
tion is anecdotal. The Blackout History Project (1965)
reported few criminal incidents, consistent with the
increase in social cohesion hypothesized by Siegel et al.
(1999), when New Yorkers assisted each other and
behaved in ways that suggested an increase in informal
regulation and community social cohesion.
The results from the 1977 blackout, however, were
somewhat different (Blackout History Project, 1977).
Several areas of the city experienced arson, looting, and
increased levels of violence. The police reported making
in excess of 4,000 arrests and the city experienced
$60 million in damage. The 1977 blackout occurred
during a time of economic cutbacks in social services,
and it is argued that those cutbacks created an
atmosphere in which the informal regulatory power of
the community had already been eroded, leaving the
community vulnerable to the effects of the blackout.
One examination of the blackout's effects revealed
that crime characteristics reflected patterns of social
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disorganization. Genevie et al. (1987) compared ten
areas where looting of stores took place to ten where
looting was not found. Information was collected from
roughly thirty individual respondents in each neighbor-
hood through random sampling methods and in-person
interviews. There was strong correspondence between
the reported levels of looting by survey respondents and
those officially counted; the researchers concluded that
their results had high external validity. Looting was
strongly correlated with high levels of neighborhood
social problems, such as unemployment, fear of crime,
and social disorganization. In addition, where residents
felt more positive about the police, looting was lower.
These results provided support for the conclusions that
higher levels of social problems were related to levels of
disorder and crime after an exceptional event such as the
blackout. Of course these findings are based on
anecdotal evidence and must be interpreted with
caution.
New York City experienced another large-scale
blackout in 2003 (CNN, 2003). Emergency services
(police, fire, and EMS) responded to more than 80,000
calls for service, more than double than what was
typical. Police reported, however, that the roughly 850
arrests made that evening were fewer than would be
expected on a comparable summer night. The relatively
static level of crime overall during the 2003 blackout
apparently did mask an increase in burglary, roughly
double the number recorded on the same day the
previous year (“Wasn't So Calm,” 2003).
Detroit was also affected by the blackout of 2003.
Despite its history of urban riots and social disorgani-
zation, there were few incidents reported during the
blackout in Detroit and the level of arrests seemed
consistent with patterns in other blackout cities (Hansen,
2003). Collectively, these results offer little conclusive
evidence about the effects of three large-scale blackouts
experienced in the past thirty years. Perhaps the most
solid conclusion to draw from this event is the
importance of the social and economic context at the
time the blackout occurs.
The evidence about the impact of unplanned events
on crime patterns is not well understood, offering little
opportunity for generalization. In this context, it is
important to juxtapose large-scale unplanned events
such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks to planned
events such as the Olympic Games, papal visits, and
other political events. Juxtaposing such events can help
to understand the impact of planning and preparedness.
The Salt Lake City Olympic Games, as an example of
special events policing, provide an opportunity to apply
principles of rational choice to special events and assess
the extent to which these principles compare to more
general standards of social control.
Routine activities theory offers several plausible
hypotheses as to how large-scale exceptional events
may influence crime rates. First, most of the spectators
are outsiders, not a part of the normal regulatory
processes at work in the area and unfamiliar with the
local mechanisms of formal social control. As such, they
serve to reduce the level of guardianship and increase
the vulnerability to victimization in a community
during an event such as the Olympics. Second,
opportunities for crime are increased during the
Olympics in part because of the presence of a large
number of strangers in renting houses and utilizing
local services. In addition, visitors increase crime
opportunities because they typically engage in lower
levels of guardianship than permanent residents. In a
sense, being on vacation is often accompanied by a
reduced level of attention to daily cares, including
those associated with guardianship.
Finally, motivated offenders may be drawn to the
games to take advantage of what are perceived to be
“easy marks,” individuals paying attention to entertain-
ment rather than matters of personal safety. The
Olympic Games are accompanied by a number of social
and cultural events that attract large numbers of people
for the purpose of celebration. The “theme” tents
sponsored by alcohol producers and the open-air street
markets that accompany such events are two good
examples of this. Indeed, the single most dramatic
security event in Salt Lake occurred on eve of the
closing ceremony in just such a venue.
Crime and the Olympics
The Olympic Games is one of the largest of all world-
class sporting events held in one location. The games
capture a number of dynamics that can be found in
special events in the United States including the World
Series, Super Bowl, visits from foreign religious and
political dignitaries, political conventions, and large
music festivals. On the world stage, economic and
political summits, World Cup Soccer, and similar events
like the Olympics tax the capacity of hosting jurisdic-
tions to respond to issues of safety and security.
Little research had been conducted on the impact of
the Olympic Games on routine crime. The small body of
work that existed on this topic suggested that the
Olympics had little impact on local crime. For example,
the Olympic Intelligence Centre reported that crime
rates during the games in Sydney, Australia were
consistent with figures reported from the prior year
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(Schwendiman, 2001). This report focussed on crimes
committed and recorded within the Olympic envelope,
the areas specifically designated as hosting venue-
related events, as compared to the greater Sydney area.
For example, the Sydney Olympic Intelligence Centre
(Schwendiman, 2001) reported 340 offenses committed
during the games in the main Olympic venue, an
average of eleven crimes per day, with theft being the
modal (79 percent) category.
There are several countervailing forces that confound
the understanding of crime rates in the context of the
Olympic Games. First, there is a dramatic presence of
law enforcement within the Olympic envelope, increas-
ing the number of sworn officers. Though these officers
are concentrated in a small geographic area, their sheer
numbers may deter crime around competition venues,
official Olympic sites (housing, official officers, etc.)
and outside the Olympic envelope. This increase in law
enforcement personnel directly increases the number of
capable guardians available to prevent and respond to
crime. That said, expectations about “routine” crime in
neighborhoods outside the Olympic envelope might be
quite different. During the Salt Lake games (as was the
case for Atlanta in 1996 and Sydney in 2000), 40
percent of sworn officers were assigned to the Olympic
envelope, leaving the neighborhoods to be patrolled by a
substantially reduced force. Thus, there may be an in-
crease in the number of capable guardians in the
host jurisdiction(s) as a whole that may mask de-
creases within non-venue areas within the same juris-
diction(s)—while there may be more police, they are
deployed largely in service to the games and less so to
the surrounding communities.
Second, the influx of large numbers of spectators,
officials, and participants actually swells the denomi-
nator in the rate of reported crime. It was estimated that
the summer games in Sydney attracted nearly 6,500,000
spectators (Schwendiman, 2001) to the games and that
more than 2,000,000 visitors attended the games in Salt
Lake. These spectators—by and large—are affluent,
law-abiding citizens, though potentially attractive tar-
gets for victimization. The “suitability” of the influx of
visitors may be enhanced by their likely ignorance of
known problem areas and possible lack of knowledge
about local subcultural norms. The impact of temporary
populations may lead to an incorrect assumption about
crime patterns as their numbers are not captured in the
residential population figures, the denominator in crime
rates.
Large planned or unplanned events hold the capacity
for affecting the critical dimensions of routine activities
theory: suitable victims, motivated offenders, and
capable guardians. Routine activities theory shifts the
focus of inquiry away from offenders and to the criminal
event itself (Cohen & Felson, 1979). It does so in a way
that reflects the complex interactions between victims,
offenders, and locations that produce “crime.” In this
context, suitable victims and motivated offenders come
together in time and space to create the opportunity for
crime. The likelihood of crime occurring is increased
when guardians capable of preventing or deterring such
events are absent. Crime then is a byproduct of the
“routine activities” of individuals that structure their
interactions with others, the locations they frequent, and
social circumstances they encounter. Brantingham and
Brantingham (1993, pp. 261–263) consider several
assumptions of the routine activities perspective that are
directly relevant to this discussion:
“The decision process leading to the commission of
any particular crime begins with someone who is in
a state of readiness for crime; neither motivated
offenders nor opportunities for crime are uniformly
distributed in space and time; and target suitability is
tied both to the characteristics of the target and to the
characteristics of the target's surroundings.”
Routine activities theory presupposes that there are
features of places that make them more or less
conducive to crime. That crime is not distributed in
random spatial patterns is an accepted principle of
criminological theory. The notion of crime “hot spots” is
suggestive of the understood fact that crime tends to be
heavily concentrated in reasonably discrete areas.
Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) argue that places
can be crime “generators” or crime “attractors.” Bars
and similar establishments can be generators of crime in
that they produce or create the social circumstances that
result in problems. In other circumstances, places might
be considered to be “attractors” of crime, that is, there
are features of land use or social interaction that attract
crime-prone individuals. Arcades, bus stops, or city
parks could fulfill the role of “attractor” in that they
attract individuals of varying criminal propensities to
meet in time and space, thereby creating opportunities
for victimization.
The context of the games in Salt Lake City
The social, political, and economic context of the
host jurisdiction ultimately shape safety and security for
all Olympic Games. This includes how security is
designed and implemented, the nature of the local
geographic context (tightly concentrated or dispersed),
and of course, the crime experiences of the local
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jurisdictions before the Olympics comes to town. Each
of these factors shapes the patterns of crime and
responses from the community and government. A
significant part of the crime context for the Salt Lake
Games was that the games occurred approximately four
months after the events of September 11, 2001, creating
a larger federal presence for this Olympics than any
other games held in the U.S.
The security planning for the Utah games spanned
seven years and included more than $310 million spent
on security for the games. In total, nearly 12,000
individuals worked in a security role during the games
(11,848). Of this total, 6,553 were sworn police officers,
including 2,225 Utah state and local sworn officers and
2,100 federal sworn officers.1
The military contributed 3,500 individuals to the
security effort, with 695 law enforcement volunteers,
and 1,100 fire and emergency management services
personnel (Governor's Office, State of Utah, 2002,
p. 26). The authorized strength of the Salt Lake City
Police Department was 415 sworn officers, but at
the time of the Olympics the department functioned
with roughly 400 officers. The state of Utah had
only twenty law enforcement departments with fifty
or more sworn officers, with Salt Lake City and Salt
Lake County being the two largest police agencies
in Utah. In sum, the influx of new security
personnel for the Olympic Games exceeded the
sworn capacity of all police departments in the state
of Utah.
In the end, 40 percent of the Salt Lake City Police
Department's officers were assigned to Olympic duties.
Such assignments typically began two weeks before the
opening of the games, and concluded shortly after the
closing ceremonies of the Para-Olympic Games that
immediately follow the Olympics. This deployment
strategy resulted in 60 percent (240 officers) of the Salt
Lake City Police Department workforce being dedicated
to “routine crime” outside the Olympic envelope. Such
workload shifts had implications for public perceptions
of police response, as well as for the capacity of the
police to respond to public demands for service. As such,
this represents a potentially interesting and important test
of the relationship between resources, the community
demand for services, and police response.
Salt Lake City, Utah is located in the Wasatch Valley
in North Central Utah, and the city of Salt Lake City has
a population of 184,723 residents. West Valley
(110,000), Ogden (78,492), and Clearfield (26,400)
are the next largest cities in the metropolitan statistical
area. The mountainous nature of the terrain surrounding
Davis, Salt Lake, Summit, Wasatch, and Weber counties
makes the region geographically isolated from other
population centers, making it an excellent site for a
Winter Olympics and a more challenging site from the
perspective of security.
Crime in Salt Lake City provided another part of the
context of public safety for the Olympic Games. In 2001
(the year before the 2002 Winter Games), Salt Lake City
recorded eighteen homicides, a rate of 9.7 per 100,000
residents. That rate was slightly higher than the rate for
the U.S. as a whole, and put the city's homicide rate near
the bottom for homicides in cities its size. For the city of
Salt Lake, a violent crime rate of 631 per 100,000 was
recorded for 2001. The U.S. rate per 100,000 citizens for
2001 was 504, somewhat lower than that for Salt Lake.
The property crime rate for Salt Lake City was 8,267 per
100,000 residents compared to a U.S. rate of 3,656 per
100,000. In general then, while Salt Lake had a lower
homicide rate compared to that of large U.S. cities for
2001, other violent and property crime rates in Salt Lake
were higher than the U.S. average. At minimum, this
suggests that Salt Lake City was generally kept busy in
responding to “routine” crime.
Study design
This study examined three issues: changes in the
pattern of routine crime, the impact of the Olympic
Games on citizen demand for police services and the
response of law enforcement to crime during the games.
All three measures were included because of the
potential impact that the reduced police force would
have on these measures. This design employed official
data, including computer-aided dispatch data, crime
reports, and arrests provided by the Salt Lake City
Police Department. These data were used to test the key
assumptions outlined above, namely, that the presence
of the games in a community alters one or more
dimensions of routine activities theory, which results in
a discernible change in crime patterns.
Measures
Three specific sets of data are used to address these
hypotheses. The first of these data sources was calls for
service. Calls for service were measured from the
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system of the Salt
Lake City Police Department. CAD data represent a
measure of citizen demand for services. During periods
of reduced guardianship caused by an exodus of local
residents (such was the case with the Salt Lake City
games), it would be expected that citizens' calls to the
police, especially for less serious offenses such as
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quality of life crimes, might decline. Calls for service
data are important because they are independent
measures of citizen demands for service and do not
reflect police-initiated activity.
The second measure examined was crime data
reported by the Salt Lake City Police Department
(e.g., crime incidents). This measure was an indication
of the extent to which calls for service or on-view events
were deemed to rise to a sufficient level of legal
sufficiency to result in a police report. This figure also
represents a measure of police activity, as a measurable
fraction (perhaps 10 or 20 percent) of crime reports are
generated by officer-initiated actions instead of requests
for service by the community. Crime reports represent a
decision by line level officers and their managers to
invest the limited available resources (especially during
the games) in specific offenses.
The third measure in the data was arrests. Arrests are
an indicator of police activity and responsiveness to
citizen demands for service. Like crime reports, arrests
represent a decision by law enforcement to invest
resources in the response to crime. Taken in tandem,
these data represent a wide range of demands and strains
placed on law enforcement personnel before, during,
and after the Olympic Games.
These three measures were obtained from the Salt
Lake City CAD and Records Management System
(RMS) for the period of eighteen months prior to the
Olympic Games and seven months following their
conclusion. This allowed for a sufficient number of
weeks prior (seventy-three weeks), during (three
weeks), and after the games (twenty-six weeks) that
can both de-trend the analyses as well as examine the
effects of seasonality.
Analyses
The primary goal of this research was to understand
the impact of the Salt Lake Olympics on local routine
crime as measured by calls for service, official police
incidents, and arrests. The routine activities perspective
presents several plausible hypotheses about how large
exceptional events might influence official crime
measures. It could be reasoned that the presence of
Olympic Games would effectively result in a spike in
calls for service, official incidents, arrests. In terms of
calls for service, the games could be expected to result in
an increase in the number of reported crimes commen-
surate with the increase in suitable targets. Similarly,
both recorded incidents and arrests could be expected to
go up to reflect possible actual increases in victimiza-
tion but also increases in police personnel (capable
guardians) that are able to detect and respond to
apparent violations of the law.
It is also possible that large planned events would
result in decreases in all three measures. In this scenario,
the volume of calls for service might be expected to
decrease for two distinct but related reasons. For crime
outside the Olympic envelope, victimization might drop
as a result of substantive alterations to routine activities
caused by an exodus of individuals from the general area
and alterations to daily routines by those remaining. For
crime inside the Olympic envelope, increased security
personnel and target hardening strategies (e.g., visible
security presence and security cameras) might function
as deterrents. Decreases in official incidents and arrests
could be experienced outside the Olympic envelope as
the number of guardians capable of detecting and
responding to “routine crime” is redirected inside venue
areas. Decreases in arrests and incidents might also be
realized inside the envelope due to increases in capable
guardians. Such an analysis is well suited for time series
methods.
The first step in the analysis plan explored the
statistical difference in the means for the three data
sources before, during, and after the games. A one-way
analysis of variance model (ANOVA) was used to test
for statistically significant differences in these means. In
addition to a means comparison, a Tukey post-hoc
analysis technique provided for multiple comparisons of
groups to determine statistical differences between
subgroups. To further test for a significant effect of the
games on police workloads, time series analysis was
used to test whether pre-post Olympics trends were
significantly different from workload levels that oc-
curred during the Olympics.
Findings
Comparison of means
The average number of weekly calls for service,
police incidents, and arrests are detailed in Table 1
(trend charts are included in Appendix A for reference
purposes).
The Salt Lake City Police Department received an
average of 4,553 calls for service per week in the
seventy-three weeks prior to the start of the Olympics
(February 8, 2000). The average number of weekly
calls for service increased only slightly to 4,635
during the games. This represented a negligible in-
crease of 2 percent or approximately eighty calls per
week. There also continued to be a slight increase in
calls for service after the games that represented a 3
percent increase over the pre-games weekly average.2
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In all, the average number of calls for service
remained reasonably static at approximately 4,600
calls per week over the entire analytic period. This
suggested that there was no statistically significant
increase in demand for public safety services by the
community as a whole during the Olympics, but
equally important no decline in such calls either.
The comparison of means for police generated
incidents and arrests tells a different story. The SLPD
averaged approximately 1,344 recorded police incidents
per week in the seventy-three weeks before the
commencement of the Olympics. The total number of
recorded police incidents decreased by 15 percent or
203 incidents per week below the pre-game weekly
average during the games. The post-hoc analysis
indicated there was a statistically significant decrease
of 203 weekly incidents during the games and a
subsequent statistically significant increase of 200
weekly incidents afterwards. This analysis indicated
the pre (1,344) and post (1,341) weekly averages were
statistically indistinguishable, and that whatever mea-
surable effect occurred during the Olympics went away
at their conclusion.
The arrest data showed a pattern similar to that of the
police incident data. SLPD recorded approximately 400
arrests per week in the seventy-three weeks leading up to
the games. The weekly mean dropped almost 50 percent
to an average of 216 arrests per week during the games.
Also similar to the incident data, the weekly average
number of arrests also quickly increased to 381 arrests in
the thirty-one weeks following the games. The ANOVA
analysis indicated a statistically significant difference in
means (d.f. = 2; F = 23.11; p < .000). The Tukey's post
hoc analysis indicates there was a statistically significant
decrease of 191 weekly arrests during the games and a
corresponding statistically significant increase of 165
weekly arrests after the games. Although the post-games
weekly average remained 6 percent less than the pre-
games average, the difference was not statistically
significant.
In summary, the comparison of means tests indicated
that the Olympic Games had differential effects on the
various measures of demands for police services. The
measures could be largely distinguished by the source
of the workload or demand. The ANOVA model
suggested the Olympics did not have a statistically
significant effect on citizen demand for services as
measured by calls for service data, but did in fact have a
statistically significant effect (decrease) on indicators of
law enforcement controlled workload measures. This
would indicate a decline in the ability of the police to
respond to calls for service, largely in part because of the
deployment of a substantial part of the force to the
Olympic mission.
Interrupted time series analysis
ARIMA models were used to further test the impact
of the Olympic Games on routine police workload (Box
& Jenkins, 1976; Box & Tiao, 1975). There are several
features of time-specific sequentially ordered data that
make the ARIMA technique particularly useful.
ARIMA techniques are effective in parsing out the
effects of seasonality and time dependency among
observations (e.g., data points) that are common features
of time sequenced data. After controlling for these
features of time ordered data, the ARIMA model also
provides an analysis of the effects of discrete interven-
tions. This “interrupted” time series compares pre and
post intervention trends while controlling for seasonality
and data dependency. The application to the current
problem and data seemed particularly appropriate.
ARIMA analysis involves an iterative model build-
ing process where the analyst diagnoses the structure of
the trend and then builds the appropriate statistical
model to test the effects of an intervention. ARIMA
models have three structural parameters that must be
diagnosed and modeled, autoregressive (p); difference
(d); and moving average (q) parameters (see McDowall,
McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay, 1980). For the parameters
of a time series model to be estimated correctly, the
series or trend must be stationary. Stationarity refers to
the degree to which the data series fluctuates or varies
around a fixed mean. A nonstationary trend is
Table 1













Calls for service 4,553 4,635 4,679 2% 1% 3%
Incidents ⁎⁎ 1,344 1,141 1,341 −15% 18% 0%
Arrests ⁎⁎⁎ 407 216 381 −47% 76% −6%
⁎⁎p < .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p< .001.
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represented by a nonzero integer in the d term. The
differencing process involves subtracting a value from
the preceding kth observations with k representing the d
parameter. The autoregressive parameter reflects the
mathematical relationship between an observation and k
preceding values. The most common autoregressive
function is the first-order process represented by
ARIMA (1, d, q) (McDowall et al., 1980, p. 32).
Finally, the moving average parameter (q) is similar to
the autoregressive parameter except that it represents the
affects of past error that cannot be modeled with the
autoregressive parameter.3
Model identification process
Since each of the data series included a discrete
intervention period (the start and end of the Olympics),
the trends were diagnosed using the seventy-three pre-
games observation points. The initial autocorrelation
(ACF) and partial autocorrelation (PCF) autocorrelo-
grams indicated a substantial spike at lag 1 that was
sustained for several lag periods.4
Similar procedures were used to diagnose and model
the trend for the official police incident and arrest data.
Police incident and arrest data were used because, when
coupled with the calls for service data, they presented an
extensive picture of the demand for police services and
the degree to which police translated “demands” into
countable crimes and arrests.5 Similar to those for the
call for service data, the ACF distribution showed a
significant spike at lag 1 that was sustained for several
additional lags. The initial spike that was sustained for
several subsequent lag periods suggested a second order
autoregressive process. To test the adequacy of the
tentative ARIMA (2,0,0) model, the generated error
term was modeled to discern if the distributions for any
lag periods reached statistical significance. The figures
indicate the error term was reduced to white noise and
that the police incident data fit the ARIMA (2,0,0)
model. The same findings were evident when the
ARIMA (2,0,0) model was diagnosed using the full time
series (figures not shown). Collectively these findings
provided strong evidence for a change in the pattern of
data during the Olympics from the pre-and post-game
periods.
The initial autocorrelograms for the pre-interven-
tion arrest trends also revealed a significant spike at
lag 1 that decayed abruptly for the following two lags
only to reveal another series of spikes for lags 4, 5, and
6. This was indicative of an autoregressive trend, but it
was unclear if the trend was a first or second order
trend. Two models were constructed and diagnosed
where the autoregressive term was assumed to be a
first and then second order term. The model was rerun
assuming the autoregressive term to be both first and
then second order. The modeled error term for the
ARIMA (1,0,0) series (available from the authors)
graph indicated no significant spikes in the lag series
suggesting the data fit the time series and the
remaining error was reduced to random error. The
same process was followed to test if the time series fit
the ARIMA (2,0,0) model and again the findings were
largely the same. The modeled error term did not
exhibit any significant lags. When modeling time
trends, one goal should be to establish a parsimonious
model thereby reducing it to its simplest state. Since
the two models seemed to behave similarly, the
ARIMA (1,0,0) model seemed to be the best fit.
Effects of Olympic on police workloads
Once the trend series were diagnosed, the final step in
the analysis was to model the data series and determine
if the CAD, incident, and arrest trends during the games
were significantly different from the pre-post games
trends. Intervention components can be abrupt or
gradual and can be either temporary or permanent in
duration (McDowall et al., 1980). In this case the games
were considered an abrupt, temporary intervention since
there was a definable intervention period with a start and
stop of approximately three weeks. A dummy variable
was used to denote the time periods representing the
presence of the games with (1) indicative of the games
and (0) their absence. For purposes of this analysis
weeks six, seven, and eight of 2002 were considered the
intervention time periods. Controls for seasonality were
introduced by including three dummy variables repre-
senting winter (December, January, and February),
spring (March, April, and May), and summer (June,
July, and August) with fall (September, October and
November) held as the reference category. Compared to
fall, the findings indicated a significant increase in calls
for service during the summer months. The Salt Lake
City Police Department reported approximately 361
additional weekly calls for service between June and
August. After controlling for seasonality, the affects of
the Olympics on calls for service could be isolated more
clearly. The findings also indicated a significant in-
crease of approximately 474 weekly calls for service
during the Olympic Games. The effect of the Olympics
was first tested on calls for service data. The ARIMA
(2,0,0) model was analyzed including the Olympics
dummy variable. The results of the time series analysis
are presented in Table 2.
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The same strategy was used to contrast the weekly
trends in official police incidents during the Olympics
from the other observation points both before and after
the games. Table 3 provides the parameter estimates for
the model that also includes controls for seasonality. In
terms of seasonality, the findings report somewhat
higher levels of weekly arrests during winter, spring,
and summer compared to the reference category
although none, except for summer, near statistical
significance. The data also suggest SLPD experienced
a reduction in recorded police incidents during the
Olympics that approximated 113 per week.
The time series model presented in Table 4 gives the
parameter estimates for the model that includes weekly
aggregated arrests. Interestingly, there was no apparent
seasonal effect in the data. This stood in contrast to the
previous two trends that demonstrated a significant or
one that neared statistical significance in the case of the
incident data. The presence of the Olympic was
correlated with a significant reduction in weekly police
arrests of approximately 128 per week. This reduction is
particularly important when one considers this repre-
sents a reduction of over 31 percent (based on the pre-
intervention weekly trend of 407) of the base rate.
The initial comparison of means tests suggested that
while the presence of the Olympic Games did not have a
significant affect on the weekly level of calls for service
received by the Salt Lake City Police Department during
the games, it did result in a significant reduction in
police incidents and arrests.
In an effort to further disentangle the effects of the
Olympics on police workloads, the effects of the games
on weekly workload trends using time series analysis
were examined. This analytical strategy is effective in
controlling for the effects of seasonality and other
features of trend variation. In summary, the findings
indicated the Olympics resulted in a significant increase
in citizen demand for service but a corresponding
reduction in police controlled outputs.
Finally, it may be that the findings may mask the
effects of subcategories of offenses. That is, violent,
property, and public order crimes may not behave in a
similar fashion, and the patterns observed here could be
attributed to changes in one of these offense types. In
order to test this assumption, the mean values for each
data source (incidents and calls for service) were
compared for each of these three crime types. The
results are presented in Table 5, and only one significant
offense (total calls for service) was found. Thus these
findings did not hinge on a single crime type, but rather
reflected crime in general.
Conclusions
The impact of special events on patterns of routine
crime raises questions about the extent to which such
special events have an impact on routine crime, and
whether they challenge the institutional capacity that
provides safety and security during those events. Based
on data from Salt Lake before, during, and after the
2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, the results
suggested that Salt Lake, in attempting to absorb nearly
2,000,000 visitors experienced an accompanying spike
in community concern for routine crime. Crime con-
cern, as measured by citizen calls for police service,
was affected by the presence of the Olympics,
Table 2





AR1 0.737 0.113 6.496 0.000
AR2 −0.061 0.117 −0.525 0.601
Olympics⁎ 474.058 222.109 2.134 0.035
Seasonality (fall reference)
Winter −171.031 152.118 −1.124 0.263
Spring −181.855 155.860 −1.167 0.246
Summer⁎ 360.533 151.808 2.375 0.020
Table 3





AR1 4.447 0.100 4.451 0.000
AR2 0.228 0.102 2.233 0.028
Olympics −113.060 59.822 −1.889 0.062
Seasonality (fall reference)
Winter 23.408 42.082 0.556 0.579
Spring 40.339 43.986 0.917 0.361
Summer 83.291 42.738 1.949 0.054
Table 4




AR1 0.472 0.092 5.155 0.000
Olympics −127.967 33.290 −3.844 0.000
Seasonality (fall reference)
Winter −9.167 19.296 −0.475 0.636
Spring 31.702 19.250 1.647 0.103
Summer 22.308 18.808 1.186 0.238
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suggesting that the games affected community capacity
for absorbing large numbers of “outsiders,” while at the
same time maintaining a sense of community that
afforded such an accommodation. Community concern
with crime measured by calls for service declined.
Time-series analysis revealed that such concerns
increased in the Salt Lake community during the
Olympics.
The presence of a detectable community concern for
crime can be attributable to many factors. In Salt Lake
community tolerance of “routine crime” was not
observed, as calls to the police appear increased outside
the Olympic envelope. These increases in crime concern
may be attributable to the massive influx of people into
the Salt Lake community.
A related explanation emphasizes other social
conditions that affect public concern for crime, as
measured by calls for service. The location of the 2002
Winter Games (Salt Lake) and the demographic profile
of visitors would be expected to contribute to a lessening
of significant concern for police action (as measured by
calls for service). Salt Lake is a physically isolated,
relatively homogenous medium-sized community, sur-
rounded by many smaller communities. Such physical
isolation played a role in who actually came to the
Winter Games. In a related way, the demographic
characteristics of those attending the Salt Lake Games
were an important factor in shaping crime and the
citizen response to crime. The Salt Lake Games attracted
many who were affluent enough to get to Utah and
afford the accommodations. Unlike the hooliganism
linked with theWorld Cup and other international soccer
events, winter sports have typically been held at small,
expensive places. Despite the attraction of “similar
others” to those in the local Salt Lake community, the
overwhelming number of visitors may have set off local
concerns for safety and order, even in the absence of
“symbolic assailants.” The physical isolation may have
actually attenuated concerns for “routine crime” as the
flood of visitors to the Salt Lake Olympic Games likely
overwhelmed residents and strained the capacity of
public safety and law enforcement. In a community
where local order is maintained at a relatively high level,
such a dramatic increase in visitors may have strained
the capacity of the local community and public safety
officials.
Taken together, the local pride for hosting the
Olympics, a perhaps less disorderly or crime-focused
clientele, and a rather physically isolated location should
have all worked together to reduce calls to the police.
The analysis revealed that despite such factors,
community concern for crime (measured by calls for
police service) increased.
On the matter of police initiated activity (e.g., police
incidents and arrests), the increased demands on the
police appeared to have produced changes in the weekly
averages of these activities before, during, and after the
Olympics. Here the system capacities appeared to have
affected police decisions about incidents and arrests. In
both cases, the capacity of the Salt Lake Police
Department was stretched across two fronts—providing
public safety services in areas immediately surrounding
the Olympic venues, as well as to the broader residential
and business communities in Salt Lake. It appeared that
the diversion of a substantial proportion of police
resources (upwards of 40 percent) resulted in fewer
incidents and arrests during the Olympics, but that such
activity and outcomes returned to their “normal” rates
once the games were completed. Incident and arrest
outcomes appeared to be the result of system capacity;
that is, the availability of the police to define and take
action, especially in the face of increased demand as
previously discussed.
There were several potential limitations to this
study. First, this was a study of a single event, albeit
the largest sporting event in the world. Testing the
Table 5
Mean comparisons of incidents and calls for service (CFS) by time group
Event types Before (n = 73) During (n = 3) After (n = 27) Total (103)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean N Std. Dev.
Total incidents⁎ 1,312.6 122.7 1,125.3 62.6 1,309.6 58.9 1,306.4 103 112.2
Total CFS 4,554.9 353.8 4,629.3 195.5 4,678.8 631.1 4,589.5 103 440.0
Property crime incidents 441.5 49.3 410.7 25.6 461.6 37.3 445.9 103 46.9
Property crime CFS 407.6 38.5 424.3 41.4 418.9 42.2 411.1 103 39.5
Violent crime incidents 106.2 16.9 97.0 14.8 111.1 16.8 107.2 103 16.9
Violent crime CFS 227.4 30.4 221.3 21.0 231.7 27.8 228.3 103 29.4
Public order incidents 250.3 29.2 281.3 22.5 259.1 26.1 253.5 103 28.7
Public order CFS 1,027.5 127.9 1,030.7 82.3 1,083.0 115.3 1,042.1 103 125.2
⁎ p < .05.
99S.H. Decker et al. / Journal of Criminal Justice 35 (2007) 89–101
theoretical and empirical findings from this analysis
against other experiences including natural disasters
(floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis), as well as
exceptional events such as terrorist attacks or threats, was
important to confirm or reject the findings here. In addi-
tion, it was not possible to fully control for the deno-
minator in crime and demand for police services. There
was a large influx of visitors, spectators, and participants
during the Olympics, as well as an out-migration of large
numbers of residents. Owing to measurement difficul-
ties, this was not fully accounted for.
Appendix A. Trend charts
Fig. 1. Call for service trends
Fig. 2. Crime incident trends
Fig. 3. Arrest trends
Notes
1. The balance between Utah and federal officers was important
as it represented the largest federal presence in numbers and
proportion in safety and security of all Olympics hosted in the United
States.
2. The time series was extended through the summer of 2002.
There was a precipitous increase in the number of calls in the
beginning of June 2002. This seemed to correspond with the
disappearance of Elizabeth Smart, the fourteen-year-old Salt Lake
City resident who was kidnapped from her family home and
subsequently reunited with her family in March of 2003. This event
might be a historical artifact that represented an increase in the post-
games mean weekly calls for service.
3. For additional information about diagnosing and estimating
the p,d,q parameters for ARIMA models see McDowall et al. (1980)
and Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel (1994).
4. The initial spike indicated an autoregressive process where
observation points were influenced by their preceding values, and the
sustained nature of the spikes indicated a second order relationship or
p value of 2.0 (see McDowall et al., 1980). The tentative ARIMA
(2,0,0) model was run on SPSS 12.0 (2000). To test if the data fit the
model, the generated error term for each observation was modeled
using the same autocorrelation diagnostic procedure identified above.
If the data fit the model, the lagged error terms should fall within the
lower and upper confidence intervals of the distribution and each lag
period should have a nonsignificant probability or Q-statistic for each
lag. The autocorrelograms indicated each error terms fall within the
expected bounds, and the nonsignificant probabilities indicated the
series was reduced to white noise or random error. The same
procedure was run on the complete series of data that included the
observation points before, during, and after the games. The same
model fit the complete data series (autocorrelograms not shown).
Thus, the data series for the calls for service data fit the ARIMA
(2,0,0) model.
5. The ACF and PCF autocorrelograms of the raw frequencies
for weekly aggregations of police incidents are available for review
from the authors. They were not included here for reasons of
parsimony.
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